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NINE JUSTICES IN SEARCH OF A DOCTRINE 
Thomas I. Emerson* 
T HE case of Griswold v. Gonnecticut,1 like few others in recent times, presented the United States Supreme Court with a hope-
lessly unsupportable piece of state legislation and an unusual variety 
of possible doctrinal solutions. The Court's response to this situation, 
and the implications· of its choice of doctrine for the future of 
individual rights in America, make an intriguing study of the judi-
cial process. 
· The Connecticut law, as a matter of social policy, had little or 
nothing to be said for it. It was enacted in 1879 and remained as a 
relic of a Comstockian philosophy which had long since ceased to 
be widely held, if it ever had been. The statute was at war with all 
accepted standards of medical practice. It invaded the sacred realm 
of marital privacy, and for all practical purposes denied to married 
couples the right of deciding whether or when to have children. 
Under certain not infrequent circumstances, it imposed upon indi-
viduals the cruel choice between sexual abstinence on the one hand 
and ill health, death, or deformed children on the other. Not gener-
ally enforced, indeed unenforceable in most instances, it hung like a 
cloud over the medical profession. More important, its enforcement 
only against birth control clinics resulted in patent discrimination 
against persons who were too poor or too .uneducated to seek private 
medical advice. Its basic purpose ·was fantastically in conflict with 
the clearly perceived need to deal with the world's second most 
critical problem-the population explosion. Even its staunchest 
supporter, the Roman Catholic Church, was ready to concede that 
the use of contraceptives by married couples involved a religious 
principle rather than a public policy to be imposed on all faiths by 
government sanction. Yet the legislature failed to repeal the statute. 2 
To the ordinary layman, Griswold v. Connecticut seemed easy. 
But to the lawyer it was somewhat more difficult. The lawyer's 
problem with the case was that the issues did not readily fit into 
• Professor of Law, Yale University.-Ed. The author wishes to point out that 
he was one of the counsel for appellants_ in the case of Griswold v. Connecticut. This 
article is written in the capacity of law professor rather than advocate, but the bias 
should be noted. 
1. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
2. There is some evidence that, at least when the case was in its final stages before 
the Supreme Court, many Connecticut legislators preferred to have the Court, rather 
than themselves, make the decision to eliminate the statute. 
[219] 
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any existing legal pigeonhole. Actually, there were five possibilities. 
The case could have been dealt with under the equal protection 
clause, the first amendment, substantive due process, the right of 
privacy, or, in extremis, the ninth amendment. In order to strike 
down the statute under any of these doctrines, however, the Court 
would be forced to enter uncharted waters. Whatever course the 
Court took, its action was bound to be pregnant with possibilities 
crucial to the development of the law in a vital area of American life. 
I. EQUAL PROTECTION 
The primary equal protection issue arose out of the fact, already 
mentioned, that although the Connecticut birth control law was a 
dead letter as far as private physicians and individuals were con-
cerned, it was effectively enforced against birth control clinics. 
Thus, in actual operation the law did not apply to the private 
sector of medical practice but did restrict the public sector, thereby 
discriminating against persons of low income or little education. 
A subsidiary equal protection issue was that the law, in effect, 
favored unmarried persons as against married couples. Contracep-
tives could be legally sold in Connecticut for prevention of disease; 
faithful partners to a marriage woµld have no occasion to use them 
for such purposes, whereas unmarried persons could legally do so. 
The same factors favored persons engaging in extramarital relations. 
Appellants did not rely on the equal protection argument as 
such, although they did urge it upon the Court as an element of 
substantive due process. At the very opening of oral argument, how-
ever, Mr. Justice Brennan raised the issue, and other Justices indi-
cated their interest in it. Similarly, Mr. Justice White, in his con-
curring opinion, although proceeding primarily on due process 
grounds, stressed that "a statute with these effects bears a substantial 
burden of justification when attacked under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment," citing three equal protection cases. 3 
The problem posed is a far-reaching one. The Court has of course 
employed the equal protection clause, with increasing refinements 
and elaboration, in the area of race relations. The important ques-
tion is how much further the Court will go in utilizing this constitu-
tional provision to aid the economically and socially disadvantaged. 
The Court is steadily moving in that direction. Already it has 
insisted upon eliminating some of the effects of gross disparity in 
3. 381 U.S. at 503. The equal protection cases cited, along with a due process case, 
were McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 
(1942); Yick Wo v. Hopk_ms, ll8 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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income between defendants caught in the criminal process,4 it has 
invoked the equal protection clause to achieve political equality in 
reapportionment cases,5 and it has relied upon the clause to protect 
a business enterprise against economic grudge legislation.6 As the 
war against poverty demonstrates, few issues are of more importance 
to the society of the future than that of assisting its disadvantaged 
members. 
However, the development of equal protection along these lines 
raises a host of obvious difficulties. It will not be easy to reconcile 
such equal protection theories with the economic and social laissez-
faire assumptions and practices upon which our society has operated 
over many years and to which it still largely adheres. These uncer-
tainties persuaded counsel for the appellants that there was little 
to gain in raising bare equal protection issues, as distinct from 
substantive due process issues, in this litigation. Under the circum-
stances, the Court, probably wisely, refrained from probing further. 
However, the interest in the issue evidenced by some members of 
the Court carries a portent for the future. 
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
The first amendment issue was raised by appellants, but it 
was relatively weak. It was quite evident that appellants had engaged 
in some conduct-such as giving physical examinations and clispens-
ing contraceptives-which could be classified only as action rather 
than speech. Their argument conceded this point, but stressed 
two other factors. First, the aiding and abetting statute, under 
which appellants were actually convicted, made it a crime not only 
to "assist" and "abet" · another person to commit an offense, but 
also to "counsel" him to do so. Thus, at least in theory and possible 
application, this statutory provision swept broadly into the first 
amendment area. Second, in the conduct of the trial no effort had 
been made to distinguish between protected areas of speech and 
unprotected areas of action; everything was mixed together in one 
grab bag. 
The case thus involved two crucial aspects of first amendment 
theory. One concerns the coverage of the first amendment-the 
extent to which it protects conduct that is not strictly speech but 
is essential to the exercise of free speech. The other, closely related, 
is the problem of separating speech from action in a complex situa-
4. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
5. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
6. See Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957). 
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tion, rather than lumping them together in a way which penalizes 
speech in the course of regulating action. The Court has come 
more and more to recognize these problems and has begun to deal 
with them.7 In view of the multiplying indirect restrictions upon 
speech, these questions are bound to become key issues in our effort 
to maintain a system of freedom of expression. 
The birth control case, however, did not present a very favorable 
opportunity for the Court to press fonvard on these frontiers. The 
Court would have had to go beyond anything it had decided before, 
and it would have had to face some hard problems in determining 
how far to cut down aiding and abetting statutes and, indeed, 
much legislation dealing with inchoate crimes. Although the Court 
refrained from treating first amendment problems directly, first 
amendment overtones were strongly heard in the prevailing opinion 
of Mr. Justice Douglas. It would seem clear that any state law applied 
to prohibit the giving of advice on the value or methods of con-
traception would fall under the ban of the first amendment. More 
important, while there is nothing in the opinions on the question 
of separating speech from action, the Douglas opinion does continue 
the dialogue on the issue of first amendment coverage. 
Ill. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS 
Substantive due process issues were central to the case. Not only 
was the direct argument strongly urged, but due process considera• 
tions were also involved in the right of privacy issue, to be discussed 
later. 
The space available here does not permit a detailed analysis of 
the Connecticut law or its operation, beyond what has already 
been undertaken. Suffice it to say that a factual demonstration that 
the law was arbitrary, unreasonable, capricious, and not reasonably 
related to a proper legislative purpose, did not pose serious difficul-
ties. This feature of the case was the basis for lay optimism over the 
outcome. The due process argument was facilitated, moreover, by 
the fact that neither the Connecticut legislature nor the courts had 
ever fully artict!lated, much less defended, the objectives of the 
legislature in enacting the law. Starting from this point, however, 
there were two aspects of due process which raised significant ques-
7. With respect to the coverage of the first amendment, see NAACP v. Button, 371 
U.S. 415 (1963). With respect to the separation of speech and action, see Gibson v. 
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963). For a further discussion of these 
matters, see Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 
1, 24-32 (1964). 
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tions. The first was whether the Court would undertake to elaborate 
a distinction between the application of substantive due process 
to cases involving personal rights and its application to· cases con-
cerning economic rights. The second involved the question as to what 
standards of due process are to be employed in considering legisla-
tion based not on objective facts related to the public welfare, but 
rather on grounds of purely moral principle. 
A. Substantive Due Process and the Distinction Between 
Personal and Economic Rights 
In the development of substantive due process, attention has 
been primarily focused upon cases where the doctrine has been in-
voked in opposition to economic or social welfare legislation. The 
earlier cases, in which due process was freely employed to strike 
dmm such legislation, are typified by Lochner v. New York.8 How-
ever, beginning in the middle thirties with Nebbia v. New York9 
and West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,10 the Court sharply shifted 
direction, and since that time it has been virtually unwilling to 
listen to the due process argument in such cases.11 At the same time, 
there has been developing another line of cases in which due process 
is utilized on behalf of individual or personal rights. This second 
line of authority commenced with Meyer v. Nebraska,12 in which the 
Court held invalid a state statute prohibiting the teaching of the 
German language to pupils who had not passed the eighth grade, 
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters,13 in which the Court ruled uncon-
stitutional a law preventing the operation of private schools. The 
Meyer and Pierce decisions, in which Mr. Justice McReynolds 
wrote for the Court, did not distinguish between personal and 
economic rights, and the decisions in fact leaned heavily upon the 
need for protecting property rights. Nevertheless, the distinction 
is implicit. 
More recently, the Court has expressly employed the due process 
doctrine to uphold individual rights in a variety of cases. One ex-
ample of this approach is Wieman v. Updegraff,14 in which a state 
loyalty program that penalized innocent membership in a "sub-
8. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
9. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). 
10. 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
11. See, e.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 
348 U.S. 483 (1955); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Lincoln Fed. Labor Union 
v. Northwestern Iron &: Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949). 
12. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
13. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
14. 344 U.S. 183 (1952). 
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versive" organization was found to be invalid. Other cases have in-
voked the doctrines of undue breadth or vagueness, which are mixed 
concepts of procedural and substantive due process, to strike down 
similar legislation.15 In Aptheker v. Secretary of State16 a federal 
statute denying passports to members of the Communist Party was 
held unconstitutional on the ground that it was not narrowly 
drafted to meet a specific evil. Yet the Court has never fully 
articulated the reasons for the difference in its approach to these 
two lines of cases. 
The distinction is nevertheless a fundamental one. In the Meyer-
Aptheker type of case, the legislation touches upon fundamental 
individual and personal rights essential to maintaining the inde-
pendence, integrity, and private development of a citizen in a highly 
organized, yet democratic society. In the Lochner-Nebbia situation, 
the legislation deals with economic regulation of commercial and 
property rights, essential to maintaining the public interest in con-
trolling a highly complex, industrialized society. The distinction 
is thus basic in striking the balance between public interest and 
private right in a modern, technologically developed nation. 
The Connecticut birth control case would have been an oppor-
tune one in which to clarify due process doctrine along the lines 
indicated. But the Court chose not to rest its decision on straight 
due process grounds and hence never reached these issues directly. 
However, there is language in the opinions which indicates that a 
majority of the Court are ready to apply the distinction. Mr. Justice 
Douglas stated in the prevailing opinion: 
We do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the 
wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic prob-
lems, business affairs, or social conditions. This law, however, 
operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife 
and their physician's role in one aspect of that relation.17 
Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring for himself and Mr. Chief Justice 
Warren and Mr. Justice Brennan, was even more explicit: 
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where 
fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be 
abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory 
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of 
15. See, e.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel, 
Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Cramp v. Board of Public Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); 
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960). 
16. 378 U.S. 500 (1964). 
17. 381 U.S. at 482. 
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a proper state purpose. "Where there is a significant encroach- · 
ment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon 
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling," Bates 
v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524. The law must be shown 
"necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the accomplish-
ment of a permissible state policy." McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 
U.S. 184, 196.18 
Mr. Justice White, alone among the majority, placed his decision 
squarely upon substantive due process grounds. The opinion is a 
narrow one, however, taking advantage of a concession made by 
counsel for Connecticut at oral argument that the sole purpose of 
the law was to prevent "promiscuous or illicit sexual relationships." 
Mr. Justice White did not have much trouble demolishing this 
position, and hence did not find it necessary to enter into more 
subtle analysis of the due process clause. 
Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Stewart did face the issue, 
however, and explicitly repudiated any distinction between the two 
types of due process cases. In fact, both Justices went farther, 
arguing that substantive due process should be limited to the issue 
of whether the legislation was unduly vague.19 The majority, it 
is clear, did not hold either view. It can be expected, therefore, that 
at some future time the distinction between personal rights and 
economic rights in the application of due process doctrine will 
be more fully elaborated. 
B. Substantive Due Process and Its Relation 
to Public Morals 
The second significant aspect of substantive due process arose 
out of the fact that the primary objective of the Connecticut statute, 
as far as could be determined, was to promote public morality by 
prohibiting the use of extrinsic devices to prevent conception, even 
within the marital relation.20 The enactment was, in other words, 
designed to compel adherence to a purely moral principle. Thus, to 
attack such legislation on due process grounds posed a special 
problem. 
When legislation is designed to promote health, safety, or the 
18. Id. at 497. It should be noted that Mr. Justice Goldberg was applying first 
amendment and racial-equal protection doctrine to issues of substantive due process. 
19. Id. at 511-18, 520-24, 528. 
20. As noted above, counsel for Connecticut apparently abandoned !!J,is position at 
the oral argument, and Justices White and Goldberg relied upon this concession. Never-
theless, this seems to be the position taken by the Connecticut courts. See State v. Nelson, 
126 Conn. 412, 424, 11 A.2d 856, 861 (1940). 
226 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 64:219 
general welfare in a material sense, its validity under the due process 
clause can be tested by considerations that can be objectively deter-
mined and rationally weighed. The questions whether the statute 
is arbitrary or capricious, or has a reasonable relation to a proper 
legislative purpose, tum in such cases upon factual material which 
can be discovered and presented to the court and upon value judg-
ments which are subject to exposition and debate. The Brandeis 
brief is, of course, a classic illustration of this approach to the due 
process clause. 
When the legislation is designed to promote public morality, 
however, the problem of applying the standards of due process may 
take a different form. In some cases, such as a statute prohibiting 
prostitution, the moral purposes may be justified by reference t<:> 
objective and rational factors relevant to the promotion of the 
general welfare. However, in other cases the legislature may under-
take to legislate purely on the basis of moral principles which are not 
subject to objective evaluation. In such a case, how are the custom-
ary criteria of due process to be applied? 
Justices Black and Stewart, as indicated above, would not attempt 
to apply substantive due process standards, other than vagueness, 
at all. But the other Justices repudiate this approach. Hence they 
cannot take the position that the simple claim of a moral aim by the 
legislature satisfies the requirement of due process. Any such a doc-
trine would immunize virtually all legislation from the mandate of 
the due process clause. It would allow the legislatures to impose 
restrain~ upon individual liberties solely on the ground that some 
insignificant fraction of the community regarded the issue as a moral 
one. Yet a law prohibiting women from appearing in public without 
veils or forbidding women to use lipstick or cosmetics, even though 
some persons in the community might regard such practices as im-
moral, would surely be held an arbitrary infringement of personal 
liberty outlawed by the due process clause. What, then, should be the 
constitutional standards for applying the due process clause in cases 
where the legislature seeks to promote public morals? 
Counsel for appellants argued that the standard in such cases 
should at least be that (1) the moral practices regulated by the 
statute must be objectively related to the public welfare, or (2) in 
the event no such relationship can be demonstrated, the regulation 
must conform to the predominant view of morality in the com-
munity. In other words, if the legislature cannot establish that the 
law promotes the public welfare in a material sense, it cannot 
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enforce the morality of a minority group upon other members of 
the community. The obscenity cases were cited as supporting a some-
what similar doctrine. It was further suggested that the first standard 
set forth above would be sufficient in itself, without the second. 
That is, if the moral principles cannot be objectively related to the 
public welfare, the legislation fails, for that reason alone, to meet 
the standards of due process. However, it was pointed out that it 
was not necessary to take this position in order to decide the case 
then before the Court. 
Mr. Justice Stewart, although not meeting this argument 
squarely, apparently considered and rejected it.21 The other Justices 
did not refer to it. Obviously the problem raises crucial but con-
troversial questions respecting the relation of law and morals. The 
Court was not willing to venture into such a delicate area. Perhaps 
one cannot blame them. 
IV. NINTH .AMENDMENT 
The ninth amendment issue was not raised at the trial by the 
appellants, and was urged in the Supreme Court only as one source 
of the right of privacy. However, to the astonishment of many 
observers, five of the Justices accepted the invitation to consider 
the ninth amendment as a basis for invalidating the Connecticut 
statute. Mr. Justice Douglas invoked it as one of the constitutional 
guarantees from which the right of privacy was derived. Mr. Justice 
Goldberg discussed it at length, but his opinion seems to give it 
a more limited significance. He expressly repudiated the argument 
that the ninth amendment "constitutes an independent source of 
rights protected from infringement by either the States or the 
Federal Government."22 Rather, his position was that "the Ninth 
Amendment shows a belief of the Constitution's authors that funda-
mental rights exist that are not expressly enumerated in the first 
eight amendments and an intent that the list of rights included 
there not be deemed exhaustive."23 The specific rights must there-
fore still be derived from other sources. 
The fact that a majority of the Supreme Court, for the first time, 
relied upon the ninth amendment in any serious way to strike down 
state legislation is an event of considerable importance. Yet there 
remains grave doubt that the ninth amendment has a significant 
future. Mr. Justice Goldberg's formulation does not seem to open 
21. 381 U.S. at 530. 
22. Id. at 492. 
23. Ibid. 
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any really new possibilities. The doctrine that the due process 
clause protects certain fundamental rights not expressly mentioned 
in the Bill of Rights or elsewhere in the Constitution is well estab-
1ished, and has been utilized on many other occasions.24 Mr. Justice 
Douglas' use of the ninth amendment carries a greater potential. 
Under his theory, the ninth amendment might be utilized to expand 
the concept of privacy or, perhaps, to guarantee other basic rights. 
It would hardly be surprising, however, if this development were 
some decades away. 
V. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY 
Since no constitutional "right of privacy" had previously been 
recognized, at- least as an independent doctrine, in order to dispose 
of the case on this ground it was necessary to establish a new con-
stitutional concept. This involved three major problems. One was 
to determine the source from which the new doctrine was derived, 
a second was to indicate the standards by which the doctrine would 
be applied, and the third was to suggest, if only tentatively, the scope 
of its application. 
A. The Creation of the Right 
With respect to the initial problem of determining the source of 
the right of privacy, there were two approaches available. The first 
was to argue that, although the Constitution nowhere refers in ex-
press terms to a right of privacy, nevertheless various provisions of 
the Constitution embody separate aspects of such a concept, and the 
composite of these protections should be accorded the status of a 
recognized constitutional right. This approach was adopted in the 
prevailing opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas: "Specific guarantees in 
the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from 
those guarantees that help give them life and substance."2G From 
the first amendment, the third amendment, the fourth amendment, 
the privilege against self-incrimination of the fifth amendment, 
and the ninth amendment, he concluded that "the right of privacy 
which presses for recognition here is a legitimate one."26 
The second approach starts from the position that the due proc-
ess clause of the fourteenth amendment, whether or not it incorpo· 
rates some or all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, guarantees 
24. Mr. Justice Goldberg himself cites, among other cases, Aptheker v. Secretary of 
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), and Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
25. 381 U.S. at 484. 
26. Id. at 485. 
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such basic rights as are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." 
The right of privacy can be considered such a fundamental right 
and hence protected under the due process clause. This view of the 
matter was taken by Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion.27 
Mr. Justice Goldberg, in his opinion joined by the Chief Justice 
and Mr. Justice Brennan, seems to have combined both approaches. 
He expressly accepted Mr. Justice Douglas' view that a right of 
privacy was "protected, as being within the protected penumbra 
of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights."28 However, he also 
pointed out that "the concept of liberty protects those personal 
rights that are fundamental, and is not confined to the specific terms 
of the Bill of Rights."29 He, too, went on to find that the right of 
privacy was a fundamental right. 
The precise source of the right of privacy is not as important as 
the fact that six Justices found such a right to exist, and thereby estab-
lished it for the first time as an independent constitutional right. 
It was a bold innovation. Yet it was not entirely without precedent. 
The Court had previously recognized a somewhat similar "right of 
association" derived from the various specific guarantees of freedom 
of speech, press, assembly, and petition in the first amendment.80 
In any event, the creation of a right to privacy is a step with 
enormous consequences. The concept of limited government has 
always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of 
certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed 
one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited govern-
ment. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects 
of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In con~rast, a system 
of limited government safeguards a private sectorr which belongs 
to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, 
which the state can control. Protection of this private sector-pro-
tection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual 
-has become increasingly important as modern society has devel-
oped. All the forces of a technological age-industrialization, 
urbanization, and organization-operate to narrow the area of pri-
vacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms, the capacity 
to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the dif-
ference between a democratic and a totalitarian society. 
27. Id. at 500. Mr. Justice Harlan's views are stated at greater length in his dissent-
ing opinion at a prior stage of the litigation. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497,522 (1961). 
28. 381 U.S. at 487. 
29. Id. at 486. 
30. See the line of cases beginning with NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 
U.S. 449 (1958), collected in Emerson, supra note 7, at 6-15. 
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B. Standards of Application 
Having established the constitutional right of privacy, the Court 
was confronted with the second problem-determination of the 
standards by which the new doctrine would be applied. Mr. Justice 
Douglas dealt with this question somewhat summarily. He noted 
that the Connecticut law, "in forbidding the use of contraceptives 
rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve 
its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon 
[the marriage] relationship."81 He mentioned specifically the prob-
lem of actual enforcement, of allowing the police "to search the 
sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use 
of contraceptives."32 He also applied the rule against undue breadth: 
"Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle, so 
often applied by this Court, that a 'governmental purpose to con-
trol or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation 
may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly 
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.' "88 
The Goldberg opinion proceeded in a somewhat different direc-
tion. It took as its primary standard a balancing test, but one which 
placed a heavy burden of justification upon the government: "[T]he 
State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which 
is compelling."34 Mr. Justice Goldberg also reiterated the Douglas 
position that the law must not "sweep un~ecessarily broadly," and 
added that other Connecticut laws on adultery and fornication 
"demonstrate that means for achieving the same basic purpose of 
protecting marital fidelity are available to Connecticut without the 
need to 'invade the area of protected freedoms.' "85 
While the Court is thus not settled upon the exact formula by 
which to determine whether the right of privacy has been infringed, 
it would seem clear that the test is more severe than that applied 
in substantive due process cases in'.volving economic regulation. On 
the other hand, in view of the newness of the constitutional right, 
the vagueness of the concept, and the general lack of precise stand-
ards, it would appear that there is little prospect of working out 
any such strict test as has been proposed for first amendment cases. 
It is most likely that future decisions will follow the Goldberg ap-
31. 381 U.S. at 485. 
32. Ibid. 
33. Ibid. Mr. Justice Douglas had previously elaborated his views in Poe v. Ullman, 
367 U.S. 497 (1961), where he had also stressed primarily the impact of enforcement 
activities upon marital privacy. 
34. 381 U.S. at 497. 
35. Id. at 497-98. 
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proach-a balancing of factors, with the government required to 
show a "compelling interest," supplemented by doctrines of undue 
breadth, vagueness, and the feasibility of alternative measures. 
C. The Scope of the Right 
With respect to the third problem-the scope of the right of 
privacy-the Court proceeded with il;s customary caution when 
venturing into new fields. The facts of the case before it, although 
strong, embraced a relatively narrow area. They were confined to 
a use statute, discriminatory in operation, which had been applied to 
married couples. The Douglas opinion, to the extent it deals specifi-
cally with the scope of the right to privacy, treats only of the "mar-
riage relationship." The Goldberg opinion is also addressed to the 
"right of marital privacy," although it does refer to the privacy of 
"the marital home" and the right "to marry and raise a family." It is 
conceivable that in future cases the Court will limit the doctrine to 
the marriage relationship, or even refuse to extend it beyond the 
precise facts of the Connecticut case. However, such an outcome 
seems unlikely, since constitutional doctrines have a way of expand-
ing beyond the boundaries of the original case. This is especially 
true where, as here, the right established is one which responds 
so acutely to the growing needs of the society. It is impossible to 
foretell, of course, what the future course of development may be. 
But it is not hard to anticipate some of the claims that will be 
pressed upon the Court in the coming years. And any appraisal 
of the significance of the Court's action in the Connecticut case 
demands some speculation, however brief and uncertain, concern-
ing the Court's response. 
One series of issues revolves around the same aspect of the right 
to privacy as that involved in Griswold-the marital relationship. 
It would seem reasonably clear that other laws attempting to prohibit 
certain kinds of sexual activity by married couples, such as so-called 
acts of "perversion," requiring a type of enforcement similar to 
that implicit in the Connecticut statute, would fall under the ban 
against invasion of privacy. Less clear, however, is the fate of state 
laws regulating not the use of contraceptive devices, but their man-
ufacture, sale, or distribution. Plainly, many forms of regulation-
such as those designed to safeguard health or safety, or requiring 
· distribution through physicians or licensed drug stores-would be 
upheld. But would an attempt by the state to enforce a total pro-
hibition of access to contraceptives by married couples, such as the 
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Massachusetts statute,36 constitute an invasion of the right of marital 
privacy? In this situation, the nature of the right is not coterminous 
· with that protected in the Griswold case. It no longer involves 
those aspects of police enforcement which loomed so large under 
the Connecticut statute. Rather it consists primarily in the right 
to have or not have children, and to plan a family. In view of Mr. 
Justice Goldberg's inclusion of the "right to marry and raise a fam-
ily" within the right of privacy, and in view of the fundamental 
nature of such a right, it would not be surprising if the Court ac-
cepted such a claim. 
If this supposition is accurate, then the corollary would seem 
to follow that action by the government to compel limitation of 
births, at least in the absence of special compelling circumstances, 
would also constitute an invasion of privacy. Indeed, Mr. Justice 
Goldberg stated this as an a fortiori proposition. The new doctrine 
thus carries serious implications for sterilization laws and future 
birth control programs. Undoubtedly the government could en-
courage birth control by many means other than strict compulsion, 
but a line between encouragement and coercion would have to 
be worked out. On the same view of the scope of the right to privacy, 
the way would be open for an attack upon significant aspects of 
the abortion laws. 
An additional area in which claims to· the right of privacy are 
likely to be invoked embraces the multitude of existing laws relating 
to sexual conduct outside the marital relation. It seems unlikely 
that the Court would disturb most of the legislation relating to 
adultery, fornication (commercial or othenvise), and homosexuality. 
Indeed, Justices Goldberg and Harlan expressly disclaimed any 
such intention. However, some of the particularly arbitrary, irra-
tional, or unenforceable aspects of such legislation might be vulner-
able. It is conceivable that sometime in the future, as mores change 
and knowledge of the problem grows, all sexual activities of two 
consenting adults in private will be brought within the right of 
privacy. 
Apart from sex laws, it would not be surprising to see the con-
cept of privacy employed in a number of other situations to safeguard 
the private sector of our lives from government encroachment. One 
obvious area in which this concept is sure to be pressed and may 
well be successful, at least in part, is electronic eavesdropping. The 
scientific possibilities are so fantastic and the invasion of privacy 
36. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 21 (1932). 
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so devastating that it is hard to believe a civilized society will not 
feel compelled to throw up some protection to individuals. This 
may come about through legislation, but the constitutional right of 
privacy could also play a significant role.37 
Other such areas also come to mind. Various kinds of police 
practices, not technically covered by the search and seizure guaran-
tees of the fourth amendment, would easily fall within an expanding 
concept of the right to privacy.38 Efforts by government officials 
to compel the production of private information through legisla-
tive committees, lie-detector tests, or other similar means may grad-
ually be brought within the constitutional doctrine. Release of 
official records of arrests not resulting in conviction might be cur-
tailed. Finally, the whole field of social welfare legislation and admin-
istration may be forced into procedures and practices more com-
patible with human dignity and integrity. Thus, restrictions imposed 
by official or semi-official welfare agencies upon the private life or 
activities of welfare recipients may well become subject to the new 
guarantees of privacy.39 
The foregoing observations are merely. indicative of some of 
the areas that may be encompassed within an expanded concept of the 
right to privacy. Undoubtedly the Court will proceed slowly, 
developing the right to privacy on a case-by-case basis. The essential 
potnt is that the key constitutional doctrine has been enunciated, 
and many forces in our society will press hard toward fuller realiza-
tion of its great potential. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
What, then, are we to conclude about the Court's performance 
in the birth control case? On the whole, the Court's choice of the 
privacy doctrine as the basis of its decision seems sound. Unprece-
dented as it was, and as broad and ill-defined as it remains, the 
doctrine still represents the narrowest and most precise formula 
available, and the one most relevant to the issues presented. This 
37. See, e.g., Judge Washington's dissent in Silverman v. United States, 275 F.2d 173, 
178 (D.C. Cir. 1960). 
38. It should be noted that to the extent specific activities of government officials 
are held to violate the constitutional right of privacy, they may be subject to criminal 
prosecution and civil redress under federal civil rights legislation. See, e.g., York v. 
Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963), holding that allegations that police officers took 
photographs of a woman complainant in the nude and distributed them among their 
fellow officers stated a cause of action under REv. STAT. § 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1964). 
39. See Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare-The Emerging Legal Issues, 
74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965). 
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creation of a new constitutional protection meets a critical need of 
society, and the new doctrine seems to have a viable and significant 
future. 
The Court will undoubtedly be attacked upon the broader 
ground that, since the objections to the Connecticut law did not 
fall clearly within any established and specific legal category, the 
Court should not have invalidated the law at all. Supporters of 
the argument for "neutral principles" can hardly be satisfied that 
the creation of a new principle conforms to their view of the Court's 
function. Furthermore, the concern of Mr. Justice Black, forcefully 
expressed in his dissent, that more is to be gained by strict adherence 
to specific provisions of the Constitution than by excursions into the 
realm of "natural law," cannot be discarded lightly. Yet it is signifi-
cant that Mr. Justice Harlan, the most ardent advocate of judicial 
self-restraint now on the Court, joined in the establishment of the 
new constitutional right to privacy. This indicates that, in the 
context of the case before it, the claim to constitutional protection 
presented could not readily be thrust aside. In any event, the role of 
the Court as guardian of individual rights has been both solidified 
and advanced. 
